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third party rather than upon the enterprise which chose to pay the contractor to assume one of its business costs.is
In making the determination as to whether a particular contractor is an employee
of the enterprise or an independent enterpriser, the fundamental question should be
whether the community, given knowledge of the terms of the relationship, would look
upon the contractor as a part of the enterprise. 6 This presumably is the same problem
the contracting parties considered when negotiating the terms of hire. In answering
the question the court or jury should weigh the factors of control, method of remuneration, and the other traditional tests' 7 for determining the existence of an independent
contractor.' 8 These factors, however, are not conclusive but merely indicate the details of the relationship. In the present case, for example, the crucial question is whether in the year 194o a salesman of the type the decedent had been was generally regarded
as "being in business for himself" or as "working for some company or companies."
Arbitration and Award-Defective Statutory Proceeding Upheld as Common Law
Arbitration-General Agreements to Arbitrate Not Contrary to Public Policyp-[innesota].-A construction company's contract to grade a school district's athletic field
provided for arbitration of "all questions subject to arbitration .... at the choice of
either party" and set forth the procedure to be followed "unless otherwise provided by
the controlling statutes."' The company demanded arbitration and appointed its arbitrator. The school district appointed its arbitrator but "reserve[d] the right to object to arbitration" on the ground that "there is no foundation laid for arbitration as so
demanded" and that "the matters are not proper for arbitration."2 Although the
statutory procedure for arbitration was not followed,3 the company brought suit upon
'S This is analogous to the situation where a creditor deals with an agent of a debtor. If the
agent fails to pay over the funds given him by the debtor for that purpose, the creditor may
still proceed against the debtor.
Compare this with the problem that arises when the enterprise knowingly engages an independent contractor who is impecunious. Here the enterprise will be liable for the torts of the
contractor. Presumably the enterprise paid less for the services of the impecunious contractor
than it would have had to pay for the services of a financially sound contractor. The enterprise
would thus secure a competitive advantage if it escaped liability for the contractor's torts.
X6If there is some aspect of the relationship which is peculiar in the sense that it does not
resemble any of the accepted patterns of doing business, the jury might be instructed to ignore
that aspect. This is tantamount to requiring adherence to the "normal" ways of doing business.
If in fact the peculiarities of the relationship are to be overlooked, the crucial question is
whether the community, given general knowledge of the basic pattern of the relationship,
would look upon the contractor as a part of the enterprise.
'7 Note 4 supra.
18The courts use these tests in both workmen's compensation and respondeat superior cases.
Reeves v. Muskogee Cotton Oil Co., 187 Okla. 539, 104 P. (2d) 443 (i94o); Century Indemnity
Co. v. Cames, 138 S. W. (2d) 555 (Tex. Civ. App. i94o); Williams v. City of Wymore, 292
N. W. 726 (lNeb. i94o); Gogoff v. Industrial Com'n of Utah, 77 Utah 355, 296 Pac. 229 (1931);
cf. Commercial Casualty Ins. Co. v. Industrial Com'n of Utah, 71 Utah 395, 266 Pac. 721
(1928); Angel v. Industrial Com'n of Utah, 64 Utah io5, 228 Pac. 509 (1924).
2 Ibid., at 7.
' Record, at 2-4.
•3Minn. Stat. (Mason, 1927) §§ 95i3-ig; Minn. Stat. (Mason, Supp. 194o) § 9513. The
arbitration failed to conform to the statute, chiefly because no submission was made naming
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the award and contended that the award was good as a common law award.4 Upon appeal to the Minnesota Supreme Court from an order sustaining a general demurrer to
the complaint, held, that an award failing to comply with the statute may be upheld
as a common law award, and that contracts to arbitrate future disputes are not void as
contrary to public policy. Order reversed with two judges dissenting. Park Construction Co. v. Iidependent School District.s
Whether an arbitration which is intended to conform to the Minnesota statute will
be upheld at common law should depend upon whether a Minnesota common law arbitration is the equivalent of the statutory arbitration. In the common law arbitration, the submission is revocable at any time before the award is made,6 the award is
enforced by suit,7 and the courts say they review awards only for "corruption or misbehavior, or for some great or palpable error or gross mistake" 8 and do not readily permit
attacks upon awards for errors of law or fact.9 In the statutory arbitration, on the other
hand, the submission is irrevocable,. ° court confirmation makes the award enforceable
2
as a judgment," and the court may vacate an award "contrary to law and evidence. '
In view of these differences, in Holdridgev. Stowell,'3 where there was "no question that
the parties intended .... an arbitration under the statute" but failed to make the submission required by the statute, the Minnesota Supreme Court refused to uphold the
defective award as a common law award because to do so would make a new bargain
all the arbitrators. A statutory arbitration must conform to the statute (Barney v. Flower,
27 Minn. 403, 7 N.W. 823 (i88i)); in particular, the submission must contain the names of the
arbitrators (Holdridge v. Stowell, 39 Minn. 360, 40 N.W. 259 (1888)), and those names must
have been inserted before acknowledgment (Northwestern Guaranty Loan Co. v. Channell,
5,3 Minn. 269, 55 N.W.

121

(I893)).

4The Minnesota statute expressly preserves the right to arbitrate at common law. Minn.
Stat. (Mason, Supp. 194o) § 9513.
-296
N.W. 475 (Minn. 1941).
6Mbinneapolis & St. L. R. Co. v. Cooper, 59 Minn. 29o, 61 N.W. 143 (1894); see Holdridge v. Stowell, 39 Minn. 360, 40 N.V. 259 (1888). The principal case may change this rule.
7 See Holdridge v. Stowell, 39 Minn. 360, 40 N.W. 259 (i888).
8 Daniels v. Willis, 7 Minn. 295, 302 (1862); Larson v. Nygaard, 148 Minn. 104, i8o N.W.
1002 (1921); 6 Williston, Contracts § 1923A (rev. ed. 1938). In Mueller v. Chicago & N.W.

R. Co., 194 Minn. 83, 259 N .W. 798 (i93s), the court indicated that other questions would
be examined if the arbitration were under the statute.
9 Goddard v. King, 40 Minn. 164,41 N.W. 659 (i889); cf. Kaufman Jewelry Co. v. Ins. Co.
of Pennsylvania, 172 Minn. 314, 215 N.W. 65 (1927) (appraisal of loss set aside because it
did not show that loss resulted from fire). Phillips urges that courts review the law applied by
arbitrators. Phillips, Rules of Law or Laissez-faire in Commercial Arbitration, 47 Harv. L.
Rev. 590 (1934).
,o Minn. Stat. (Mason, Supp. 194o) § 9513.

"Minn. Stat. (Mason,
X2

1927) §§ 9515-16, 9519.
Ibid., § 9517. The scope of review afforded by the clause quoted has not been judicially

determined. See Borum v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. R. Co., 184 Minn. 126, 238 N.W.
4 (I93x), aff'd 286 U.S. 447 (1932). Sturges doubts whether statutory grounds for review
would be available to correct common law awards. Sturges, Commercial Arbitrations and
Awards § 4 (i93o)x339
Mmin. 360, 40 N.W. 259 (1888).
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for the parties.4 The majority judges say and the dissenting judges assume that the
principal case overrules theHoldridgecase. s But the two cases should be distinguished.
The majority speak of the principal case as one "where the initial agreement of the
parties contemplated a statutory arbitration" and "the parties themselves have annulled their first agreement for a statutory arbitration" and have "substituted one at
common law."' 6 But the original arbitration agreement in the principal case might
have been interpreted to require either a common law or a statutory arbitration7 and
the only "substituted agreement" was the participation without objection in a common law arbitration. 8 Obviously, if the parties knowingly substitute a common law
arbitration for a statutory arbitration or if they make definite an originally ambiguous
arbitration agreement by carrying out one or the other type of arbitration, the court's
enforcement of the resulting award does not make a new bargain for the parties.
The principal case also presents the problem of the effect on Minnesota arbitration
law of the majority's dictum'9 that general agreements to arbitrate future disputes are
X4 This is the view in most jurisdictions. Sturges, Commercial Arbitrations and Awards
§ 5 (1930).

1sPark Construction Co. v. Independent School District, 296 N.W. 475, 477, 490 (Minn.
1941).
6 Ibid., at 477.
'?No satisfactory general criteria have been found to distinguish agreements to arbitrate

at common law and agreements to arbitrate under the statute, and it seems that each agreement must be construed in the light of its particular provisions and those of the governing
statute. Carey v. Herrick, 146 Wash. 283, 263 Pac. 190 (1928) (provision in agreement inconsistent with statute); Franks v. Battles, 147 Ark. 169, 227 S.W. 32 (1921) (fact that punishment of misdemeanor was left to court indicated statutory arbitration); Thatcher Implement
& Mercantile Co. v. Brubaker, 193 Mo. App. 627, 187 S.W. 17 (x916) (character of submission
determining); McLaurin v. McLauchlin, 2i5 Fed. 345 (C.C.A. 4th 1914) (plan actually adopt-

ed and not the name given determining). It has been suggested that common law rules govern
unless the parties manifest an intention to follow the statute. Sturges, Commercial Arbitrations
and Awards § i (193o).

In the principal case the procedure set forth in the agreement was different from that in
the statute, but the agreement stated that if statutes provided "otherwise than as hereinbefore
specified, the method of procedure throughout and the legal effect of the award shall be wholly
in accordance with the said statutes .....

"

Record, at 4. The contractor argued that this

language applied only where local statutes prescribed a procedure for all arbitrations, whether
common law or statutory.
x8 Cf. Black v. Woodruff, 193 Ala.

327,

331, 69 So. 97, 98 (igi9): "By common consent

laying their respective contentions before the arbitrators, in the absence of a preliminary order
inviting an award as to the matters in dispute, the only rational conclusion is that the parties
intended to appeal to the general powers of the court for its enforcement, if necessary [i.e. common law award]."
'9 The majority say "there was no revocation" (296 N.W. 475, 476 (Minn. i94i)) and practically admit that the discussion of public policy is dictum (Ibid., at 477). But the minority
say, incorrectly it is submitted, that there was "an effective revocation of any agreement to
arbitrate at common law" (Ibid., at 479). The reservation of rights seems too vague to constitute a revocation. For the requisites of a revocation, see Sturges, Commercial Arbitrations
and Awards § ig (i93o). Furthermore, if the school district had revoked authority to arbitrate
at common law and was aware, as its reservation of rights indicates, of the defect fatal to a
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no longer contrary to public policy. This dictum may be limited to the cases expressly
overruled and may merely make enforceable as conditions precedent agreements to
arbitrate questions of liability, as well as questions of fact 2 But, more probably, the
dictum was intended to overrule the whole of the much criticized public policy against
arbitration- and will, as the minority assume, make general agreements to arbitrate
irrevocable and, perhaps, specifically enforceable.
The revocability of agreements to arbitrate has been based upon the public policy
against ousting the courts of jurisdiction 22 and upon the inherent revocability of every
authority or agency not coupled with an interest.23 That the first ground can no longer
4
be taken as existing in Minnesota is indicated by the dictum of the principal case.2
2
The second ground has not been much relied upon by modem authority s and seems inapplicable because an arbitrator is less like a representative of the parties than like an
6
impartial lay judge.2
Whether agreements to arbitrate will be specifically enforceable is, however, more
doubtful. Inability to prove substantial damages for breach of agreements to arbitrate
renders the legal remedies inadequate. 2 7 But specific relief has been denied because it
28
is contrary to public policy to force a party to forego his remedies in the courts, bestatutory arbitration, it is difficult to understand why the district participated in a futile arbitration. If there has been no revocation before the award in a common law arbitration, all
authorities agree that the award is binding.
2"Park Construction Co. v. Independent School District, 296 N.W. 475, 478 (Minn. i94i);
6 Williston, Contracts § I92IA (rev. ed. 1938). In Colorado and Washington, where statutes
were construed to remove the policy objection to agreements to arbitrate at common law
(Ezell v. Rocky Mountain Bean & Elevator Co., 76 Colo. 409, 232 Pac. 68o (1925); Zindorf
Construction Co. v. Western American Co., 27 Wash. 31, 67 Pac. 374 (igoi)), the only effect

has been to make arbitration clauses good as conditions precedent. But no case has been
found holding that the public policy objection still survives as to revocation and specific performance.
2" Asphalt Refining Co. v. Trindad Lake Petroleum Co., 222 Fed. ioo6 (D.C. N.Y. 1915);
Berkovitz v. Arbib &Houlberg, 23o N.Y. 261, 13o N.E. 288 (1921); Delaware &H. Canal Co.
v. Pennsylvania Coal Co., 50 N.Y. 250, 258 (1872). Compare the Minnesota Supreme Court's
recent overruling of the doctrine that part payment cannot discharge a debt. Rye v. Phillips,
203 Minn. 567, 282 N.W. 459 (1938)- Sturges, Commercial Arbitrations and Awards § i5 (i93o).
2' Allen v. Watson, 16 Johns. (N.Y.) 2o5 (i8ig); Rochester v. Whitehouse, i5 N.H. 468
(1844); see Isaacs, Two Views of Commercial Arbitration, 4o Harv. L. Rev. 929, 932 (1927).
24By analogy to the Minnesota statutes from which the change in policy toward arbitration was derived, irrevocability under this dictum, as under the statute, may be limited to
agreements to arbitrate existing disputes. Minn. Stat. (Mason, 1927) §9514.
os Note 22 supra. No Minnesota case has been found which bases revocability upon agency
principles.
26Sturges, Commercial Arbitrations and Awards 369 (1930); Isaacs, Two Views of Commercial Arbitration, 40 Harv. L. Rev. 929 (1927).
27 Pomeroy, Specific Performance of Contracts § 8 (3 d ed. 1926); Simpson, Specific Enforcement of Arbitration Contracts, 83 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 16o (1934); Chafee and Simpson,
Cases on Equity 537 (1934).
28 Tobey v. Bristol, Fed. Cas. No. 14,o65 (C. C. Mass. 1845); Conner v. Drake, i Ohio St.
166 (1853).
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cause forcing a party to arbitrate when he may later revoke his appointment of arbitrators is futile,29 and because a court cannot force a party to arbitrate against his
willY' The majority's dictum may remove the first two grounds for denying specific
relief. As to the third, a court could hold a party in contempt for failure to partici33
pate, 3' could appoint arbitrators,32 and could authorize an arbitration ex parte. Unlike enforcement under the statutes, however, specific enforcement in equity would
3
depend upon the discretion of the court. 4 The majority's dictum seems, therefore, to

have removed the only obstacle to making general agreements to arbitrate irrevocable
and specifically enforceable.
Attorney and Client-Recovery of Counsel Fees in Separate Action-Res Judicata
-[Illinois].-The defendant had procured land from the plaintiff's deceased husband
by means of fraud. Having recovered the propdrty in a prior action against the defendant, the plaintiff brought a separate action to recover counsel fees and other expenses
incurred in the first action. On appeal from the trial court's dismissal of the complaint,
held, that the plaintiff may recover counsel fees incurred in the prior action if that action was made necessary by the defendant's wilful misconduct. Res judicata does not
bar a later suit for counsel's fees since such a suit constitutes a separate cause of action.
Judgment reversed. Ritter v. Ritter.,
The successful party in a law suit is generally not allowed to recover his counsel fees
from the loser as an element either of costs or of damages. 2 Many courts make an exception where one party in bad faith engages the other in litigation. Where the wrongdoer has himself brought a groundless suit in bad faith, the courts disagree as to whether the successful defendant should be allowed to recover his counsel fees. State courts
29Greason v. Keteltas, 17 N.Y. 491 (I858).
3oTobey v. Bristol, Fed. Cas. No. 14,o65 (C. C. Mass. 1845); Greason v. Keteltas, i7 N.Y.
491 (1858); Robinson v. Georges Ins. Co., 17 Me. ii (i84o); Meeker v. Meeker, 36 Conn.

4o3 (i844); March v. Eastern R. Co., 40 N.H. 548 (i86o); Kaufmann v. Leggett, 2o9 Pa. 87,
58 Ad. 129 (I9O4); Pomeroy, Specific Performance of Contracts § 22 (3d ed. 1926).
3' Cf. order to proceed to arbitration under statutes. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act. (Gilbert-Bliss,
1939) § I45O; 43 Stat. 883 (1925), 9 U.S.C.A. § 4 (1927). If a court can enforce an order to
proceed to arbitration under a statute, it ought equally to be able to enforce such an order at
common law.
32Cf. appointment of arbitrators under statutes. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act. (Gilbert-Bliss, 1939)
§ 1452; 43 Stat. 884 (1925), 9 U.S.C.A. § 5 (I927). Cf. also Anniston v. Alabama Water Co.,
207 Ala. 497, 93 So. 409 (1922).
33 Equity has not deemed enforcement of more complicated agreements impracticable; see,
e.g., Union P. R. Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 163 U.S. 564 (1896).
34 6 Williston, Contracts §§ 1920, 1922 (rev. ed. 1938).
' 32 N.E. (2d) 185 (Ill. App. 1941).
* United Power Co. v. Matheny, 8i Ohio St. 204, 90 N.E. 154 (1909); Corinth Bank and
Trust Co. v. Security Nat'l Bank, 148 Tenn. 136, 252 S.W. 1ooi (1923); Kolka v. Jones, 6
See 39 A.L.R. 12I8 (X925).
N.D. 46x, 71 N.W. 558 (1897); McCormick, Damages § 6i (93.5).
In England, on the other hand, the court has discretion to allow a litigant to recover such expenses as part of costs. Several writers, after comprehensively reviewing the policies for and
against the English and American "costs" systems, have favored adoption of the English view.
Goodhart, Costs, 38 Yale L. J. 849 (1929); McCormick, Damages § 71 (1935).

